

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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SELENDANG AYU :
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INTERVIEW OF CAPTAIN :
ROB CAMPBELL :
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An interview in the above entitled matter was held
on Sunday, December 15, 2004, commencing at 3:00 p.m.,
before:

ROB JONES, NTSB
SEAN MCPHILAMY, USCG
CAPTAIN LEW KWOK YUE, IMC

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. JONES: It is 1500 on the 15 December, and we are interviewing Capt. Rob Campbell of the James Dunlap and Captain, if I can get your, just a take on that, the day's events, when you were first notified and pursue it from there.

CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Excuse me, as I understand it, we, and when I say 'we' here in Dutch Harbor, we received our first phone call, somewhere around 3:00 or 3:30 in the morning, and --

MR. JONES: And, excuse me, that's on the 6th?

CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: 7th.

MR. JONES: 7th?

CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: On the 7th. The person who was answering our phone at that time, that is why I have to, you know, I personally was not aware of anything until probably 0700-0800. I believe they got a phone call at that time from the Harbor Master, I think it was, no I take that back, I think he said it was actually from the other tugboat that was down at (Indiscernible), but anyway because they had been contacted by somebody in Singapore, I think they said, about whether they are available and he was just calling us to see what our situation was, and at that time the fellow was taking the phone call.

Subsequently, it was the mate on my vessel, but

1 this time he was actually acting as captain of another little
2 tugboat back in town. But he basically told them our
3 situation were we were really de-crewed for the holidays and
4 we will, you know, pass it on to our office or stuff like
5 that and basically just go from there and at that time that
6 was just sort of about it for us. We just did not really
7 think we would be involved with two other tugboats in town
8 and they said the fact that we did not really have a full
9 crew on board, he sort of put it out of our -- he sort of put
10 it out of his mind, and then subsequently there was just
11 absolutely no way I could keep track of the phone calls.

12 Then, half in during the day, I mean, we got calls
13 from different agents, the Harbor Master, you know, quite
14 often people will call us even though they know we can't do
15 something because we keep on talking who else is around, so
16 it is quite often we get involved in these things, even
17 though we might pass another number along just like we told
18 these people that, you know, they had this -- the Sidney Foss
19 sitting there, but anyway, so the phone, you know, agents
20 would call, Harbor Masters would call, pilots would call in
21 just to tell are you guys aware of this, you know, it just
22 becomes "item in town" type of thing then. I guess if
23 nothing else to break the boredom -- hey did you hear, this
24 is going on and everybody, the phones are just ringing.

25 Say, subsequently to that, I am going to say 0700-

1 0800 in the morning he came down to my boat and he told me
2 that there was this bolter in drift. They were trying to
3 find somebody to go get and pass it on to our office which is
4 in Herbert, Washington and again you know, told everybody we
5 could think of that, I mean you know, the perfect boat to go
6 get them was the Sidney Foss because they had a full crew and
7 they are actually, you know, built for ocean towing so to
8 speak whereas everybody around, you know, everybody else
9 around the harbor, you know, harbor (Indiscernible). And
10 then basically at that particular point, I did not really
11 talk to anybody or actually know anything was going on until
12 I want to say, I think noon or 1 o'clock we got a phone call
13 from APL because the Sidney Foss was unloading their barge at
14 their dock and we got a call to move their barge, because the
15 long shore would needed it moved a little bit and that was
16 basically the first inkling I had that they had even gone
17 because where they were tied up, you know, alongside their
18 barge, we could not see them.

19 And so, naturally, I assumed they were, you know,
20 they were gone. I could not tell you when they left, I am
21 just going to guess, you know, if somebody was to ask me
22 12:00 or so. And we had heard a rumor from one of these
23 phone calls that the Redeemer had left or was planning to
24 leave earlier that morning and say basically other than that
25 as far as the first, you know, the first part of the whole

1 day, that's about all we, I mean, you know, the office called
2 and, one time and told us that they have been getting a lot
3 of phone calls about whether or not we could go out and they
4 had been telling we really didn't have the crew and were not
5 really set up for it and say, we more or less just kind of
6 put it out of our minds.

7 And then about 1800, it was when we finally start,
8 you know, our story really kind of begins. About 1800, my
9 boss called me and said that they have just -- just been
10 getting a lot of phone calls and you know, pressure, for lack
11 of a better word, to try and, you know, go out and help out
12 and he just asked me if I would be willing to go and I said
13 it is okay if I go, we will take off and see what we can do,
14 and say that was at 1800 and we basically we had had our life
15 raft off for its annual inspection and we had had passed so
16 we were waiting for a brand new one and we just picked up a
17 brand new one that day and so basically between 1800 and
18 about 1930 we just spent the time, met the guys, dig out what
19 we would have used for soft tow lines out of our Z-Drive Room
20 because once we -- once we leave the dock we -- it gets
21 flushed with the deck and we cannot open it up and we got
22 that out and had it rigged up right behind the tow winch and
23 then basically since we knew we were going to get totally
24 thrashed out there, we started putting everything away and
25 you know, sticking stuff on the floors because we knew it's

1 going to fall all over the place and then went over to the
2 City (Indiscernible) Dock here where they have a crane and
3 loaded our life raft on, which of course would not fit the
4 original cradle so we had to get a couple of chain binders
5 and, just kind of chain bind it in place and then, say then
6 about 1930, when we got all this stuff done and we took off.

7 Then say weather-wise you know, moderately tough,
8 especially for these tractor tugs, you know they don't have
9 these, you know, we don't have any rolling trucks and no real
10 keel or anything, so they can be pretty tough riding and for
11 awhile there, I mean, all could keep cheerful and the weather
12 -- the weather just seemed to be the worse probably because
13 of the confluence of currents and things like that. We were
14 down to almost a third, just bucking in to it and, so we just
15 kept, you know, we just keep changing the RPM as the weather
16 permitted type of thing and then basically arrived on scene
17 about 0430.

18 By that time, I am going to say it approximately,
19 it was about 10 -- 2200 -- 2200 -- or 2230 on the 7th, I had
20 actually talked to the Redeemer, I had been calling the
21 Sidney trying to help, you know because all I had, the last
22 position the company gave me was from like 1530 or something
23 and the Redeemer answered me and gave me position they were
24 at, which they said was a few miles from where everybody else
25 was and that the Sidney had a line on them. So, basically at

1 that time, we did not make any extra effort to go any faster
2 than we had to because they had a line on them so we just
3 sort of made our, you know, best speed without beating
4 everything up and arrived on scene about -- I think it was
5 about 0430.

6 At that time, the Sidney told us that they were
7 having, you know, they just -- they just could not even pull
8 it into the -- into the -- swim and they just could not get
9 the ship to turn around into the weather for them and they
10 were going about as hard as they figured they could and at
11 that point, you know, I just felt especially with, and there
12 were two things, the weather was just, it was in my opinion
13 too tough to put anybody out on the deck especially, you
14 know, in the dark and the added complication at this
15 particular point that the Sidney had a line on them so
16 maneuvering room had been a little tighter trying to work
17 around the bow.

18 And so at that time I just kind of felt, you know,
19 since Sidney had a hold of them and that we would just wait
20 until daylight when we thought we would have, you know, maybe
21 the weather would come down and we would certainly have some
22 better working conditions because of the daylight to more or
23 less come up with some kind of a plan that would help the
24 situation out. One of the first anxiety we thought about was
25 because the Sidney could not get him to turn around I had

1 considered first thing in the morning, before we tried
2 anything else, we might actually try and put a line up on his
3 stern and see if we could just yard on that as hard as
4 possible to see if could help spin it around from the Sidney
5 so they could get a nice tow on things fully, you know, I
6 mean, just fully realizing that wherever line we put up was
7 going to be sacrificial. What I mean, if we could put up
8 something that would, you know, would even take, you know 4
9 or 5 good jerks, maybe we can, get the stern to start coming
10 around and then help them out.

11 So, I went to lay down about 4:30 and told the
12 mate, just you know, give me a call a little bit later, I
13 mean, say we were rocking and rolling so much, there was no
14 way other than sleep till daylight anyway, so I will just go
15 and catch a little sleeping. And then at say at 7:30 came
16 running down to tell me that Sidney had parted their towline.
17 So, at that time, once the Sidney moved away trying to
18 retrieve their tow wire we just, we just knocked up a little
19 bit closer to the ship to take a look at things at that
20 particular point and just felt with the way they were -- the
21 way they were wallowing and the way the weather was and the
22 dark that, the way we would have to try to hook up with the
23 ship, but it just was not safely feasible and that I guess
24 really as far as where we were concerned it was pretty much
25 the story the whole rest of the day every, you know, we would

1 stay pretty close to the ship hoping that you know, all we
2 needed was, you know, half an hour or 45 minutes, the wind
3 would stop blowing and let the seas back up a little bit.

4 It would not have taken a lot but it was just, I
5 mean, it was one of those things, it was not a big bearing
6 sea storm, but it was just on the upper side of moderate that
7 we could not work with, we have to, you know, with the gear
8 we have, we have to get right under their bow and fasten
9 things up with the heaving line and they just -- they were
10 just too much surging back and forth. And you know,
11 basically, I mean, that's kind of the rest of the story for
12 everything, I mean, throughout the day as far as us trying to
13 do something it just never got good enough for that I felt,
14 you know we could get right up under the bow and you know we,
15 I mean that is the problem, every time we do this we have to
16 be in just 40-50 feet off the bow and hold her there while
17 the guys pass the line up to the ship and it was just, just
18 was never good enough.

19 MR. JONES: So, for the rest of that day -- Mr. Rob
20 Jones -- after daylight just kept assessing the situation and
21 staying close enough to do stuff and --

22 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yeah, I do not think we ever --
23 I do not think we ever got more than a mile or, you know, 2
24 miles at the most, only when we were kind of run up a little
25 bit, you know, up into the weather so we could turn around

1 and come back and have a little bit nicer ride. Half the
2 time I would, you know, we spent an awful lot of time, you
3 know quarter mile or closer and the time we would get the
4 furthest away from the ship was any time there was any kind
5 of a flight operation going on and we try to stay out of any
6 kind of flight path, but we were just basically at constant,
7 you know, we had everything set, if we had got a break we
8 would have been there in five minutes and, you know, if we
9 had gotten what we had thought was good enough, we would, you
10 know, I do not think even when we were far, you know, we were
11 never more than 10 minutes from the ship, and it just never,
12 you know, every time anybody would even ask what we thought
13 you know, we would get a little bit closer and look and it
14 was just never enough that I felt it was safe to get out
15 there and try and you know again we just have to work so
16 close to the ship to get gear up.

17 MR. JONES: Did you ever talk with Captain on the
18 Selendang over radio or --?

19 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Oh we talked many times. I
20 mean, you know, not about anything in particular, you know,
21 just captain, you know, are you going to try and put
22 something up for real and what do you think about putting
23 something up. We discussed, I mean, we discussed numerous
24 times during the day, you know, that I felt it was too bad
25 outside to put my crew on deck. We discussed, I mean, later

1 in the day, you know, we, he and I discussed the, you know,
2 putting the anchor down and he asked me what kind of bottom I
3 thought there was for holding and I said, say numerous, you
4 know, short conversations during the day about what we could
5 I mean, you know, usually when we say a period of time would
6 go by where, you know, either the, you know, the Coast Guard
7 would be sort of making the rounds of talking to people about
8 what you thought and say that, you know, periodically Captain
9 of the Selendang would you know again ask me, you know and
10 there were a couple or 3 times as I remember when we came in
11 real close to the ship that, you know, he must have thought,
12 you know, I was getting ready and he would call me up and ask
13 me if this is what I was getting ready to do and I would,
14 then I would tell, no captain, I am just looking and I just
15 still think it is, you know, too bad to try this. So we had
16 numerous conversations just mostly about that.

17 MR. JONES: Was most of these conversations over
18 VHF?

19 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yes, everything was over the
20 VHF.

21 MR. JONES: What channel?

22 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Mostly 6, channel 6, but then
23 everyone is got on something would happen on 16 just because
24 everybody, you know there was, everybody had so many channels
25 that they were monitoring and I think everyone's

1 (Indiscernible) I think I ended up talking to the Coast Guard
2 more often on channel 16 then I did just most everything was
3 on channel 6 for the ship and that was the one we were,
4 because he was also talking to his crew up on the bow and
5 stuff, so that's how we were kind of you know, keeping
6 tracking of everything. So I would say at the very least 90
7 percent of our conversations were on channel 6 and say
8 everybody in the group was on those channels.

9 MR. JONES: What kind of gear did you have to put
10 up to them if weather permitted?

11 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Basically we just have a plain
12 old standard heaving line that we, you know, we have to get
13 close, you know, close enough where we can throw that up and
14 that is the biggest problem and especially, you know, we were
15 just limited, you know, how far somebody can throw something
16 like that especially with that weather, you know, you are
17 talking, I mean, you know, 100 feet at the maximum and we had
18 that hooked on to some 10 and some also 12 inch what they
19 call I think blue steel pulley that is rated for about say
20 240,000 pounds breaking strength something like that.

21 We had that all laid out behind the tow winch to
22 send up but say there were just never, and of course again we
23 have to, these boats in particular, I mean, once you stop
24 them, you know, you try to hold them and they just go rolling
25 (Indiscernible) so they just rock and roll and deck covers

1 with water and of course you work it up by the ship, you know
2 when the swells come up and they push you back and you know I
3 have to have somebody on the stern just about constantly
4 giving me directions because your, you know, distance
5 definition is a little off so, I mean, you know, you think
6 you are 5 feet away from them and the guys who are down on
7 the deck you know, we were 60-70 feet away from them and they
8 cannot do anything but, so you are going back and forth like
9 that and they just say your -- you are so go and when
10 (Indiscernible).

11 We must have been trying to work under the ship
12 back and forth where they got everything hooked up. In this
13 particular case, we tried to get hooked in, we got hooked in
14 to their anchor chain, but you are just -- you know, you are
15 back and feeling the whole time for you know half hour or 40
16 minutes in that case. In this particular case, I mean, we
17 would have to get down there and you cannot untie anything
18 until you are just about ready to go because it will start
19 watering all over the place so by the time you get underneath
20 them and get everything done you are still looking at, I
21 mean, if everything went smoothly, you are looking at 10-15
22 minutes. You have to kind of try and hold her there and it
23 just, it was one of those things where, like so many times an
24 awful lot of this, you know, if you could have been there
25 exactly the right time a lot of this you know 8 out of the 10

1 swells were not so bad but that 9th and 10th one were just a
2 great big old roller that would just, you know, take us and
3 throw us all around and dip the bow on the ship and there
4 just wasn't -- I mean -- there just was not enough time to
5 and say to work under conditions that we had to,
6 unfortunately.

7 MR. JONES: What's the horse power on your tug?

8 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: 4000. They call it 5000 once in
9 a while because, I mean, as far it has got like 52 tons of
10 (Indiscernible).

11 CAPTAIN LEW: Say again. 52 tons --

12 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yeah 52 tons of (Indiscernible)
13 I think it is. It has actually got 4000 horse power engines,
14 but we have got the nozzles on there so if I was to tell a
15 figure it is about 5000 horse power engine.

16 MR. JONES: Okay. While you were assessing and
17 standing off like that, do you remember what the Sidney Foss
18 was doing at that time?

19 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Well, basically from 7:30 on
20 till the end they were talking about that they were trying to
21 repair their tow wire and basically to keep water out of
22 their fiddle because the swells did break over their stern
23 head, they had to keep running into it so the whole time we
24 were all drifting this way they were actually running away
25 from us at a couple of knots so at one time they actually

1 got, they got quite away from, ways from us while they were
2 trying to get their line hold on and work on it because I
3 guess according to the captain every time they would try and
4 turn and run back down wind they would start getting the
5 water in that would actually come into their fiddle where
6 they were trying to work on the line.

7 MR. JONES: Now, just -- just, I am not a -- I am
8 not a tugboat operator, so relying on your expertise, the
9 line that had parted from them, what we understand, was the
10 hoser and do you understood that they were putting an ice
11 blaze in in the hoser?

12 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yes.

13 MR. JONES: Could they have possibly just shorted
14 that line and given them the, Selendang a bitter end and they
15 could have just went around the bow up there.

16 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I would have assumed so.

17 MR. JONES: What --

18 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I really, you know, there is
19 already so much of this, you know, from what little we get
20 out here in the middle of nowhere in the newspapers is you
21 know Monday morning quarterback -- I really don't want to get
22 into what everybody else might have done. I mean I just
23 feel, I mean I feel plenty that way. I mean there is all
24 kinds of ideas you know I got today but you know I just don't
25 really want, I mean, I feel kind of funny about speaking for

1 somebody else, I just --

2 MR. JONES: I have no intention of asking you to
3 just guess or surmise and I do not want to speak in for of
4 the other one, another tug or anything. What we are about is
5 just the factual information of that day. Again, with my
6 inexperience with tugs except for where they towed me around
7 at times, what I was -- what I am asking is in the conditions
8 that were there that day, could it even, would it have been
9 possible that just a bitter end figure-eighted around this?

10 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I think so.

11 MR. JONES: So we -- that would still be --

12 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I am going to have to, you know,
13 like I say speak for myself, and a lot of this obviously, I,
14 you know, it was terrible-terrible weather, but since they
15 did, oh I mean, since they did as I understand had a line
16 thrown in, I mean, I wondered about that when I first heard
17 that they had a hold of that, I considered that an awfully
18 good piece of seamanship to even get it, I mean, the weather
19 was that tough, but again if they did, you know, they had
20 more charges for their line-throwing gun and things like
21 this, you know, my opinion is, you know, numerous other
22 things could have been done under the situation. We just --
23 we were just stuck. If we had had a line-throwing gun, we
24 would have tried numerous -- after the fact who knows? I
25 mean, but I, you know, I do not know, if we could have made a

1 connection because of all the bouncing around, I mean, you
2 know, the Coast Guard later on could not make a connection,
3 so, I do not know what we could have done from our little 100
4 foot platform, but we sure did and that would have been one
5 of our plans.

6 MR. JONES: That's fine and like I said, I don't
7 want you to speculate but we were using your expertise here
8 to see what was -- what was a probable or a possible
9 possibility that day. Did you do any -- one of the things we
10 did hear from interviewing the crew was an offer of salvage
11 over the radio. Those words were just relayed and that was
12 from the Dunlap to the Alex Haley. Do you have any
13 recollection of that?

14 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: None. I can't even, I can't
15 even imagine what we might have said that would have been
16 interpreted that way. I mean, you know, something we talked
17 about in hooking up or something I guess might have been
18 interpreted that way but as far as I know that word never,
19 never really, again, I guess I can't speak through the few
20 minutes that I was not in the wheelhouse and what my mate
21 might have said, but I doubt that word came out of our
22 mouths.

23 MR. JONES: Okay. That was just a question we had
24 to pursue because we have heard -- we have heard it from, you
25 know, other interviews. Now you were on scene -- were you in

1 the vicinity when the evacuation with the Coast Guard
2 helicopter sort of taking place? Were you able to witness
3 any of that and could you just describe that or tell me the
4 sea state at the time, maybe how which way the vessel was
5 lying?

6 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: During the first evacuation, we
7 were, say feel fairly close, I mean, we could not see, you
8 know, individual people going up or whatever, but again every
9 time they did flight operations, we would sort of head off in
10 the other direction to stay out of the way type of thing, so
11 we were kind of listening and I was driving more and also
12 the, I know the guys and the rest of the crew were kind of
13 looking back through the binoculars just watching all of it,
14 every once in a while they, you know, call my attention I
15 mean we would look back there and you know, say my God, you
16 know, when you look out there and you see those helicopters,
17 they are just kind of hovered and hardly moving in on us, you
18 know how can you do that?

19 I mean the winds are changing when doing this and
20 doing that, but say other than just, you know, seeing them
21 and marveling at, you know, say from our perspective anyway,
22 it looked like the guys were just about sitting on the deck
23 routine and we sort of well that's, you know, most what it
24 seemed like they were loading them up pretty fast. So
25 obviously there wasn't, you know, in our mind it was not a

1 big cycle time, but really that is all we saw. I don't, you
2 know, I don't believe I have ever even, you know, saw a
3 basket, I mean, as far as from our angle of things. We would
4 just, we would look out there and I mean you would see the
5 one, I remember, I mean, I remember once in particular when
6 the, my mate, he works with the Coast Guard much more than I
7 do, he has got all the numbers down, but it looked like the
8 orange and white one to me, he has got all the numbers down.

9 I remember in particular once just thinking that
10 while the big one was facing some guys off the little orange
11 guy was over there and just, I mean, say it was just say,
12 like he was stuck there and thinking to myself my God how
13 would you know keep the deck steady, but that is really, say,
14 you know, until the final, that's about as close as we were,
15 say we really didn't see anybody in there and the same thing
16 the final rescue after the helicopter crash it was just such
17 a maelstrom of water and dark and stuff like that. We could
18 see the, you know, see the guys with their light going down
19 and see the basket once in a while going down, but we really
20 could not, you know, we could not see anything in the water
21 or anything like that.

22 MR. JONES: And you weren't close enough to witness
23 the helicopter going down or what might have caused it or --

24 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Well, we were probably, you
25 know, close up but again we were staying, you know, pretty

1 close to the ship, when all of a sudden the helicopters when
2 they arrived back on the scene and one of the things I sort
3 of learned years ago when I was on a rescue job out North
4 Pacific at the Hyundai Seattle and had guys onboard and on
5 this particular day they had no lights which is what I did
6 later do our boys tried to stay as close to them with all of
7 our deck lights on, you know, thinking that you know, even if
8 you are helpless, it gives them a feeling that somebody is
9 there.

10 So we were kind of staying pretty close, but again
11 once the helicopter showed up for the final evacuation and
12 now it was dark and everyone saw, I mean, it was the hail or
13 snow was coming down so much you could not see anybody a
14 quarter of mile away from you. So we were definitely headed
15 you know, we were trying to head away from where any flight
16 pattern might be. And all of a sudden the helicopter -- you
17 know the helicopter said the other one had crashed and at
18 that particular time that is when we turned around and we ran
19 back as fast as we could.

20 I will say, at this particular point, we were maybe
21 you know, a mile or so away so we were back on scene in five
22 minutes or whatever. So we never actually, we didn't see
23 anything crash and then when we got closer we could see you
24 know, the light the every once in while you could see the
25 basket going down and you could see the light in the water

1 and the waves you know crashing over the ship and stuff like
2 that and, you know, we could not see anything in the water
3 or, you know, what they were even, you know, looking for at
4 that time. Say we got back as far as we could because at
5 that particular point, the helicopter pilot, the Haley is a
6 couple of miles off shore in his flight stations and of
7 course basically getting further away from everything because
8 they were (Indiscernible).

9 So the helicopter pilot had suggested over the
10 radio that possibly he would take anybody he picked up and
11 either quickly send them on the beach so that he could get
12 back and look for more or set them on one of the tugboats so
13 we basically got as close as we could and they turned on, we
14 got all the deck lights on and my crew got out a bunch of I
15 would say life rings and blankets and threw a couple of extra
16 pots of coffee on at the same time thinking that you know, at
17 this particular point, we obviously were hoping that they
18 would pick up more than one load and we would only be like a
19 minute away from where the helicopter was versus you know
20 flight manager or whatever for the Haley and we thought we
21 were going to be taking on some survivors, and then all of
22 sudden it seemed like they had the one load and you know it
23 was my understanding that they could not see anybody else at
24 that time, so now they were going to go back out to the
25 Haley, and then a couple of minutes after that they came back

1 on the radio and said that one of the members is injured and
2 they were going to go to Dutch Harbor.

3 So, at that particular point, I mean, again from
4 our perspective, you know, we assumed they could not see
5 anything else or they wouldn't be going to Dutch Harbor
6 because well obviously at that time (Indiscernible) and then
7 at that point we just again, we just jogged around as close
8 to the ship as made any sense without and to do too much
9 turning around especially after the lights went out on the
10 forward part of the ship, I didn't see that, I just told my
11 mate about him, at least this guy you know he sees some
12 lights out and with all the deck lights on the flood lights
13 and said we can't, we actually tried once they figured out
14 the helicopter wasn't coming back we tried to work our way in
15 there and Sidney Foss had actually called us and asked us if
16 we thought we could get in there and see if we could get the
17 guys off the boat because we have so much more rubber on our
18 boat because of the other ship, it's just a tugboat.

19 So we tried to work our way in there to see if
20 could actually get up there and nose end of the ship knowing,
21 you know, we are going to beat something up and if we could
22 just you know just hold her there long enough for the rescue
23 swimmer and the Captain could jump aboard, that would be
24 great but I got to about 600 feet from the ship and I had 30
25 feet of water under me and the way the swell was running

1 there was just, there was no way we could get anybody off of
2 the windward side of things because the way the weather was
3 breaking over things and the way the ship was laying I was
4 kind of reluctant to try to go around the stern because it
5 was too close to the beach and I was little reluctant to go
6 too close to the bow because of the anchor chain and then if
7 we got inside I was a little concerned about you know if the
8 anchor slipped anymore whatever we would obviously be between
9 the ship and the beach and it was one of those things you
10 know we thought it was, you know, one of those things you
11 think about but at the same time you know it really isn't
12 practical, you want to do it but again, you know, the
13 surface is running in so high and you know the ship is in you
14 know 5-6-7 fathoms of water and we take, you know, 3 fathoms
15 of water, we throw in the big surf, it just isn't practical
16 you know, as much you want to do it just isn't practical to
17 do it.

18 MR. JONES: When you were 600 feet away and
19 assessing this, which way was the vessel laying, how the sea
20 was hitting it?

21 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Probably -- at that time, I
22 would say the vessels was laying like at about 45 degree
23 angle to the beach, this was, I mean, I thought of this was
24 before it broke up and started breaking up and you know, just
25 I would say, you know, quite often you just see the swells

1 would just go totally over mid ship's part of her or at least
2 break all the way over it.

3 MR. JONES: So, gentleman -- I am just referencing
4 the chart up there, so that little nub and 45 to the beach,
5 was she pointed up to the north?

6 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: She was pointed, I would say at
7 this point she was probably pointed north-east and the north-
8 west swell was just kind of breaking on her broadside.

9 MR. JONES: Ah, broadside of the port valve?

10 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yeah.

11 MR. JONES: Yeah, okay.

12 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: On the port side.

13 MR. JONES: Okay. And after the helicopter had
14 gone in and you kind of assessed the situation coming up
15 within 600 feet and couldn't get in there, you laid back off?

16 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yeah, we stayed pretty close.
17 We would go in and I would say after that I had come in to
18 about two tenths of a mile off of the ship and then we
19 probably ran out until we were may be a mile away and then we
20 would make our turn and come back, like that kind of kept it
21 at two tenths, we had 60 feet of water, at least we were
22 actually, looked like we had 60-70 feet of water when we were
23 two tenths so that was, you know, enough water I felt
24 comfortable without having to really worry and so we kind of
25 kept in that area, again with all our lights on and then to

1 say we got lost once in a while we started to get to the far
2 end of our track there and the Coast Guard was on a 10-minute
3 schedule with a rescue swimmer which, I would say, actually
4 seemed like they called a young fellow every 5 minutes or so,
5 but every time they called, and quite often when they called
6 he wouldn't answer right away, pretty soon or maybe come on,
7 come guy, come on answer the radio, come on, come on and on,
8 he would be looking back. And so by this time the lights
9 were out on her bow and you can't see anything and everybody
10 is worrying about the thing just (Indiscernible). He would
11 not answer once in a while I assume trying to dig his radio
12 out or whatever, so every time that would happen we would
13 spin around real quick and we come back a little bit closer
14 and every once in a while either just flash our light to get
15 his attention or then I would really, I would talk to him
16 thinking that come through and then he would answer and
17 everybody kind of breath a sigh of relief, we turn around and
18 head back up the sea for the next go around.

19 MR. JONES: Could you estimate the size of the sea
20 or the swell about the time the helicopter crashed, that was
21 striking the Selendang?

22 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Well, I think the, that's a
23 tough one since it was so black and dark and nobody is
24 really, you know, paying attention to that to send in a
25 weather report but just based on the way our boat is designed

1 and stuff like that I would say you know quite a few 25
2 footers, only because I mean, there was quite often, that's
3 my level of eyesight and quite often when one of them, the
4 bigger ones would come through in a series, quite often I
5 would be just sitting there looking at the top of them when
6 they went on by and then obviously, as you got closer to the,
7 you know, when would run in and get close to the ship they
8 would just, they would just start to build up on that shoal
9 so you know, I am sure by the, you know, a lot of time, by
10 that time, they hit the ship, you know, of course then the
11 ship wasn't a movable object. It seemed like ever once in a
12 while we would get close and we would see one of those things
13 breaking over, I would venture to say that the spray at least
14 had to have been 40-50 feet in the air, I mean, as far as
15 (Indiscernible) the swell when it hit the ship might have
16 (Indiscernible) when they came up on the shoal might have
17 really only been a 25-30 footer but by the time it hit that
18 ship and all that wind the spray had to have been 40-50 feet
19 up in the air.

20 MR. JONES: Okay, I have only got one more question
21 right now. Did you, were you able to witness the Haley's
22 enough to see when they tried to fast a line?

23 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yes, we were very close to them,
24 I mean, you know the Captain might even have considered me as
25 wave and we were very close. What we had been planning on

1 doing was, when he came to do that, we were going to stay
2 real close, our idea was, and the Sidney Foss at one time
3 mentioned the same thing, we were going to hang up in case
4 somebody ended up in the water. Because by now everyone was
5 swelling, they were getting water right up on deck of the
6 ship and the Haley every once in a while you can see their
7 propellers. So our plan originally had been, as soon as, we
8 stay out of his way while he made his approach and then after
9 he kind of got on the up wind side where we were, we were
10 going to swing around the other side and just be standing by
11 in case anybody happened to end up in the water and so yeah,
12 we were quite close when he made his approach and probably
13 watching it fairly well, I mean, because, you know, we got,
14 you know, we got same thing, geez I wish we had a platform,
15 you know. It's kind of here he is, I mean, he is going like
16 this every once in a while and I don't know how long he is
17 250, 330.

18 I mean, you know, we were thinking to ourselves you
19 know about the same thing, what it would be like if our 100
20 foot platform was trying to do that and I knew they were
21 passing their line from their flight deck which first basket
22 that was high out of the water as my wheelhouse. So yeah, we
23 were watching that quite closely, they got the messenger
24 across and they were, I would imagine they were probably and
25 they were actually getting fairly far from the ship, I

1 thought, you know, fairly far from the ship for, you know how
2 much line they threw on the ship was they have to pull, I
3 mean it seemed like they were 400-500 feet from the ship when
4 they veered off a little bit and then the next thing we heard
5 on the radio that they had lost their steering for a minute
6 and had to park their messenger line and then --

7 MR. JONES: Yeah, I think --

8 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: They were --

9 MR. JONES: Well, I am sorry. Could I just jump in
10 through -- I am Jones again. You heard this over the VHF?

11 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yes.

12 MR. JONES: Was this the captain of the Haley who
13 was talking to the --

14 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Could be -- could be tell you.
15 There was an officer on the radio telling the captain on the
16 ship that the captain of the ship had asked for more slack,
17 the line on the ship was coming tight and they wanted more
18 slack, more slack and then whoever was on the radio on the
19 Haley advised him that they just had to just had to sever the
20 messenger line because they lost their steering momentarily.

21 MR. JONES: To you does that sound more mechanical
22 or that it was may be steered away because of the waves and
23 the sea they were in?

24 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I, that was up to, because they
25 immediately said they were going to try and re-rig for

1 another pass, I assumed because of the style of boat she was
2 and I thought that maybe she had just started to get
3 broadside, I mean, I didn't believe, I mean, a mechanical
4 thing wasn't the first thing that jumped into my mind. I
5 thought, you know, that she was coming around and that she
6 didn't without giving a full (Indiscernible) which of course
7 you know, when she was trying to pass messenger line to get
8 the ship going for more (Indiscernible) she could get her
9 steering back, get under control, I guess you might say, you
10 know, get her in the, you know, kick her in the butt and get
11 some RPM which case she couldn't be allowed anymore.

12 MR. JONES: Okay. Did she ever try another
13 attempt? The Haley?

14 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: No, I think she was getting
15 ready, at the end they were getting ready to, and they said
16 they were going to do it again and then I think that part is
17 a little blurry in my mind, but I am thinking that must be
18 about when the ship must have finally fetched up. I
19 honestly, as I said, that part, just a little by I --

20 MR. JONES: Sure.

21 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: For some reason, I can't quite
22 put that, I mean, I know they mentioned they were going to
23 attempt another one and they were going to make a little
24 circle around and for some reason like I said the rest of
25 that part is blank to me and the next thing I know we were

1 trying to get people off.

2 MR. JONES: Okay. I am going to, you know, take a
3 drink. I am going to turn it over to Sean now. You have any
4 questions, Sean?

5 MR. MCPHILAMY: Captain, this is Sean McPhilamy
6 with the Coast Guard out of Anchorage. Thank you very much
7 for your time today.

8 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Okay.

9 MR. MCPHILAMY: I have just a couple of questions,
10 just to follow up very complete, couple of details about my,
11 I will ask your experience onboard the James Dunlap. How
12 long has it been?

13 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I have been running the James
14 Dunlap ever since she was built in 1995. She came up to
15 Dutch Harbor in 1996, I believe it is, and I work basically
16 180 days a year. There has been a few other and since she
17 has been here we have had four other people who relieved me
18 but that's all I do.

19 MR. MCPHILAMY: And prior to the Dunlap, in the
20 past, has you run another vessels or --?

21 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I have been working for Dunlap
22 in Dutch Harbor since about 1991 or 1992, I am going to say.
23 Since they have always had a contract to do the container
24 ships in town for APO and we were just in a various assorted,
25 different boats on that same contract.

1 MR. MCPHILAMY: I was just getting interrupted
2 here. Thank you for your experience. Like to just confirm
3 when you arrived Alex Haley was on scene. Can I confirm your
4 perceptions of the Alex Haley as Coast Guard on scene, were
5 they in charge of the situation, were they assisting, you
6 have a perception of the Alex Haley?

7 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I -- that's -- I mean, I don't
8 know who was in charge. I didn't, I mean, I got the
9 perception that the Alex Haley was deferring to the Sidney
10 Foss quite often and that was the perception, I mean that
11 they were not in any particular team with it. They were sort
12 of deferring to the Sidney Foss and I just, I mean, I didn't
13 get a feeling that the Alex Haley was -- were calling the
14 shots, this is what we would like you guys to do know.

15 MR. MCPHILAMY: Like to just follow up on your
16 statement of (Indiscernible) and I think the word you might
17 have used was a bit of pressure from your boss saying that he
18 wanted you to go out. Can I ask, I am not aware of the
19 towing business, and in this regard at what level this
20 becomes a job and which level this was an opportunity to
21 rescue? Were you out there hired? Was this an assist
22 opportunity?

23 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I was under the impression -- I
24 was under the impression that we were working for P&I and
25 that we have been hired by P&I to go out. My company, I

1 guess, to answer your question, my company doesn't believe in
2 salvage. I have never gone out on a salvage job for a towing
3 company. This is probably the dozen -- dozen of these type
4 of things I had gone out on between, you know, barges on the
5 beach, ships adrift and you know, we pulled off, we pulled
6 two ships off the beach, the processor off the beach, we went
7 out on the Hyundai Seattle 12 years ago, pulled in a bulk
8 carrier a couple of years ago in the Dutch and then you know
9 numerous fishing boats, but we have never -- that's something
10 that's, you know, around the galley table, you know, we are
11 always kind of joking about that our company doesn't do that.
12 We don't, they just, they have never been into that, you
13 know, because, you know, say no cure no pay they just as soon
14 -- Quite often these kind of jobs, it is my understanding,
15 that it is somewhat standard in the industry as people quite
16 often charge double daily or eight for this type of work and
17 that's -- to the best of my knowledge all we have ever done
18 is that I have never -- I have never been on a salvage claim
19 done at all.

20 MR. MCPHILAMY: Thank you. I believe as the
21 helicopter crashed, I think the statement you had made was
22 that you knew that the captain and the rescue swimmer were on
23 in and then the radio come every five, every ten minutes we
24 are going on. How is that you came to know that it was the
25 captain and the rescue swimmer? Was that passed over the

1 radio?

2 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yes. At some particular point,
3 I don't believe it was the first couple of conversations but
4 very-very quickly in the situation it was known that it was
5 the captain because one of the things the rescue swimmer was
6 concerned about was, you know, this was some kind of, as we
7 came to find out one of his first jobs and he was concerned,
8 he wanted to know where he thought the safest place he should
9 be while he was waiting and by that time, at some point in
10 these conversations we had, we had been informed that it was
11 the captain so even the response from the Haley well you
12 know, ask the captain, you should, you know. So as I say we
13 knew quite early that it was, you know, the swimmer and --
14 but not right, not in the first conversation, but very
15 quickly.

16 MR. MCPHILAMY: And I guess from myself, I would
17 like to just kind of get a feel for your arriving on scene,
18 the Selendang Ayu, Alex Haley, Sidney Foss, Redeemer, is this
19 an extremely busy area where you were watching whether and
20 making sure you are not in bow with another ship's track, how
21 are you staying and jogging to keep awareness of where the
22 other vessels are? Are you using radar, how -- is it anyone
23 just you know?

24 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: No, nobody, nobody is all that
25 crowded. The Redeemer for some, they were miles, I mean,

1 when we first got there they were miles away. The Coast
2 Guard cutter was, you know, a couple of miles away and I
3 mean, from the ship on station and we basically stayed a
4 little, I think, we basically were closer than anybody else
5 than Sidney Foss obviously and the first couple of hours I
6 could dive, as I say, once we got there we made kind of a
7 little circle around things trying to see it. We thought we
8 could do it and at that point and so that's when we got
9 thinking about maybe trying to put a line up on their stern
10 later. Then I went to lay down and the mate was just jogging
11 in so I don't know exactly where the Redeemer was for those
12 couple of hours.

13 And then, say starting 0730, at 0730 on the 8th I
14 doubt that we were ever, I don't think we were ever more than
15 a couple of miles away and there may be the rare occasion
16 when we were running the one direction while we tried to
17 (Indiscernible) and you know, quite often the Alex Haley was
18 sort of, say, they were, you know, a couple of miles away and
19 then they would run down, downwind and the same thing. I
20 think, you know, quite often I think they were spinning, in
21 my opinion, they were spinning most of their time trying to
22 stay stemming in the things for you know possible flight offs
23 and beginning about, it's may be 10 o'clock or so, 10:00 on
24 the 8th the Redeemer they just decided they went into
25 (Indiscernible) Bay and just anchored up. I guess they just

1 figured they couldn't do anything.

2 So they weren't out there and then for a large part
3 of the morning the Sidney Foss was really nowhere near
4 because they had ran into the weather to retrieve their line
5 and work on it and so until they came back really close on
6 scene again 1400-1500 may be when they (Indiscernible)
7 actually they came all the way down to get on the scene and
8 then they after that the two of us we sort of just made
9 opposite tacks so we would be on the north end and they would
10 be on the south end of the turn and the Coast Guard was just
11 sort of doing the same thing. We were just kind of coming
12 down until they were pretty close to the ship and then go on
13 back and so no, there was never a tracking problem.

14 MR. MCPHILAMY: Thank you very much Captain.
15 Captain Lew.

16 CAPTAIN LEW: Captain, thank you very much for
17 coming (Indiscernible). Captain, I would just like to ask
18 normally on your tug what is the number of crew that you have
19 onboard the ship?

20 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Normally -- we are contracted by
21 APL to have four people onboard. We have --

22 CAPTAIN LEW: Four people?

23 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yes.

24 CAPTAIN LEW: With how many on the deck side and in
25 the engine side?

1 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: We don't, we have, we have one
2 person who is a deck-hand. He is actually an engineer but he
3 is also an AB because we have an automated engine room so
4 basically we have, our contracted work pass us with three
5 deck hands and me as the captain (Indiscernible) then when we
6 go out and if we were, normally, under normal circumstances
7 we also have two other little tugboats in town and have crew
8 on them. And under normal circumstances our crew, we would
9 have a five-man crew when we did something like this.
10 Master, mate, engineer, AB and cook AB. Unfortunately, this
11 is the time of the year where all the container ships in town
12 start bypassing and only coming into town every other week if
13 that so over the holidays we traditionally let the crew drop
14 off, so at this particular point we just had three men.

15 CAPTAIN LEW: Normally when your men, you have kept
16 a minimum skeleton crew onboard the ship, three men, and
17 normally you will leave all your contacts' numbers so that if
18 there is any job that is to be done, each of them will be
19 able to contact all of the units out.

20 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: All -- no, nobody lives here.
21 We all live down in Washington and Oregon --

22 CAPTAIN LEW: I see.

23 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: So when they are gone, they are
24 gone.

25 CAPTAIN LEW: I see. So for this job how many men

1 did you have actually going up for this task?

2 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: When we came out to get you
3 there were just three of us, there was me, my mate and my
4 engineer. I mean that's basically the reason we just didn't
5 you know we just didn't jump right off the bath first thing
6 in the morning and under normal circumstances we were
7 committed to this APL ships so we can't even leave for a lot
8 of these jobs.

9 CAPTAIN LEW: Okay. We see you got a call from APL
10 on the 6th 1300 to move the barges and at same time you also
11 have got a call I am not too sure whether my time is correct
12 or not at 1200 hours from your boss to start moving up. Am I
13 correct?

14 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: No, no, no, no, we, I didn't, I
15 got the call from my boss that he definitely would like me to
16 go if I was willing at 1800.

17 CAPTAIN LEW: At 1800. So you agreed with your
18 boss that the ship can go to this operation itself because of
19 your life raft there was at shore, you need to send it and
20 wait to receive the life raft before you proceed up?

21 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yes.

22 CAPTAIN LEW: Which means it took you -- what time
23 did the life raft actually loaded onboard of the ship and you
24 were ready to go off?

25 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: 1930.

1 CAPTAIN LEW: 1930. I know a lot of time when you
2 say you arrived close to the scene itself and you were quite
3 close and all these things. Just figuratively speaking the
4 close distance is how far away itself?

5 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I would say, you know, half a
6 mile.

7 CAPTAIN LEW: Were the Selendang Ayu in sight of
8 you all the time?

9 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I don't believe once we got
10 there that the ship was ever out of our sight.

11 CAPTAIN LEW: Captain, you mentioned that you own a
12 tractor tug with 4000 BHP and 52 (Indiscernible). Correct me
13 if I am wrong, usually a tractor tug has a (Indiscernible)
14 propeller which means you rotate your ships all around and
15 go, all around means you can spin her off --

16 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: That's right.

17 CAPTAIN LEW: You can move diagonally, you can move
18 any direction which is very suitable for bowing and unbowing
19 in calm water, but in the weather condition like that would
20 you be able to move in that situation diagonally, zig-zag,
21 and all?

22 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I don't believe that we could, I
23 guess what you say, maneuver finally, it would, it would
24 actually give us the opportunity to I think do things as far
25 as hooking up that we couldn't have done with a conventional

1 twin screw boat in other words the fact that we had a tractor
2 tug at that particular point would increase my window, in my
3 opinion, my window of opportunity to put a line up because we
4 could maneuver better around the bow, I mean, there would be
5 times when, I mean, I would attempt to put a line up under
6 conditions with the tractor tug that I wouldn't with a
7 conventional twin screw boat.

8 CAPTAIN LEW: You also mentioned that when you were
9 proceeding towards there and before arrival, your mate was on
10 watch. Am I correct in that you were taking rest before
11 arriving at the scene?

12 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: (No audible response).

13 CAPTAIN LEW: So, I believe that in your normal
14 (Indiscernible) operations when you are about to arrive at a
15 scene the mate would normally contact you and say that we are
16 close to the scene and you would be up --

17 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: (No audible response).

18 CAPTAIN LEW: You would make a discussion with your
19 mate how to go about approaching to the vessels, things like
20 that.

21 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: By the time we were say, a mile,
22 I mean say, a mile the contacts were just starting to
23 actually show up on our radar I was already in the wheelhouse
24 at that time so I made all the initial approach to your ship
25 and that's when we sort of made a, we went down one side of

1 the, we went down the starboard side of the Sidney and the
2 starboard side of your ship and across the stern just looking
3 at things over and say then I, say at that particular point I
4 know, we talked to the Sidney about what we, you know, might
5 possibly do in the morning because he couldn't pull the ship
6 around and I wanted to say that I talked to you about the
7 fact that I wasn't going to attempt anything at that
8 particular point and then say that was say 0430 or so and
9 then I went to bed with say orders to my mate that you know
10 give me a call if anything happened and say, you know, give
11 me a call just before daylight which I knew, I mean, I
12 wouldn't sleep that long in that weather anyway but then say
13 I was just laying there at 0730 when he came in my room
14 saying that Sidney had parted their wire or their line.

15 CAPTAIN LEW: The size of the tow line, what size
16 is it and what kind of rope is it?

17 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: It's, I believe, they call it
18 blue steel pulley, that's the best I can tell you. It's --
19 we had one piece that we were going to send up first was four
20 inches in diameter or 12 inches in circumference and we had
21 that hooked on to a piece that was I guess that would have
22 been a little over three and a quarter diameter, it was
23 basically 10 inch in circumference but say the smallest piece
24 I believe is rated for 238,000 pounds and somewhere in that
25 area.

1 CAPTAIN LEW: How long you think the line is
2 itself?

3 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: It was 400 feet. I mean each
4 piece was 200 feet. We had 400 feet shackled together with a
5 60-ton shackle.

6 CAPTAIN LEW: I believe on your tractor tug itself
7 you would have got a hook on, hook itself which is able to
8 attach to the line. Do you believe this should go
9 (Indiscernible) move this particular tug itself?

10 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: No, we just, it's there, from
11 that standpoint the boat is very I guess, you say,
12 conventional coast wise set up so we have, I mean, other than
13 the fact that we have a line winch up on the bow for working
14 ships, the stern is just basically you know conventional
15 single drum tow winch with couple of thousand feet of wire on
16 it and say nothing fancy, just conventional stuff.

17 CAPTAIN LEW: Okay. I know you have mentioned that
18 most of time you don't often have such kind of experience,
19 getting all these salvage experience and in your mind when
20 you are ordered to go off for this job what did you have in
21 your mind that you were sent off for this purpose for and you
22 know that the Sidney Foss is there, the Coast Guard cutter is
23 there, you know. What do you think your purpose was there?
24 What did you think?

25 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I -- that's a very, you know, a

1 very good question. I don't know of course at this
2 particular point I didn't even realize that the Sidney Foss
3 had had a hold of you and of course so I don't know what kind
4 of messages they might have been sending, so I mean, I guess
5 to answer your question, I have no idea. I mean if I don't
6 know, I mean, I am just, I am just going to assume the only
7 thing that -- I mean, the men would ask me, you know, why are
8 we going and I said I can only assume just to make, you know,
9 somebody whoever was calling our office all the time just
10 felt happier knowing that there was "two" tugboats on the way
11 instead of just one. I guess I should say three because of
12 the Redeemer, but I don't --

13 CAPTAIN LEW: Okay. Thank you very much.

14 MR. JONES: Captain, this is Rob Jones from the
15 Safety Board. Just in your expertise if you had the line on,
16 when you approached in the morning, when you approached in
17 the morning I could see kind of daylight or at least if you
18 had a good indication of how the vessel was heading? Just
19 her heading the towline in the Foss could have approximately
20 which way was Foss set out and what was the heading of the
21 vessel at the time and --?

22 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I have no idea.

23 MR. JONES: Okay.

24 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: None at all. I mean we just --
25 when we got back, I mean, when we got that close, all I could

1 tell was that the ship was laying in the trough. The Sidney
2 Foss was off at an angle and were only trying to lead him to
3 come around and he wasn't but I didn't sit down and calculate
4 where everybody was you know, I guess this when I say,
5 frankly at this point we had been up all day today before
6 just doing our normal duties.

7 MR. JONES: Sure.

8 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I couldn't even knew, we didn't
9 even take a position because it was just like well we don't
10 really care, I mean, US Coast Guard boats were just jogging
11 around these guys and doesn't really matter where we were and
12 I couldn't have told you what their heading was or the drift
13 or anything. That was all, you know, basically later in the
14 day when we can start doing something.

15 MR. JONES: Okay, all right. That is all I have,
16 Sir. Sean, anything more?

17 MR. MCPHILAMY: No, thank you very much, Sir.

18 CAPTAIN LEW KWOK YUE: I have one more question.
19 When you said you made radar contact, you got some on the
20 radar, what range were you keeping the radar? Could you give
21 us an estimate?

22 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Normally when we run, we keep it
23 on 12 and say every once in a while we kick it up to 24 but
24 it just, we saw the -- we saw the everybody's lights before
25 we actually, I think it was the Redeemer actually because he

1 had -- he had some flood lights on so we saw those on the
2 horizon before we got any contacts and then as we got a
3 little bit closer and I was, you know, kind of
4 (Indiscernible) everything here and then say towards when we
5 got a little, you know, quite a bit closer than all, all of a
6 sudden you know we could even see the Sidney Foss all the
7 time with his lights and --

8 CAPTAIN LEW: You would not be able to give whether
9 it is 6 miles, 8 miles --?

10 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: When we first started picking up
11 contact I would just go and venture to say it was in the 7-8
12 mile range when we finally started getting consistent hard
13 targets.

14 CAPTAIN LEW: And what speed were you proceeding to
15 the ships when you were ordered to go up. Were you
16 proceeding maximum or?

17 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: When we finally, when we saw the
18 ships by this time we were enough around the corner and
19 laying in the northwest and we were making about I would say
20 10 knots. On our first way out in trying to get around Cape
21 Cheerful, until we got around Cape Cheerful when we were
22 totally bucking straight into the northwest, we were down to
23 about five there for a little while.

24 CAPTAIN LEW: How much do you think from the time
25 that you have actually activated your crew that you life raft

1 onboard the ship that clearly harbor, you went on 10 knots to
2 try and make contact. How much you think the time actually
3 made contact?

4 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Till the time we made radar
5 contact?

6 CAPTAIN LEW: I saw at 1900, you made radar contact
7 at 4:30 itself you arrived on the scene. So what I say is it
8 about 9 hours, 10 hours itself?

9 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Before we made radar contact?

10 CAPTAIN LEW: Before you arrived.

11 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Oh before we arrived alongside,
12 well that would have been basically 8 -- 8 and a half hours,
13 I guess, by the time we got you know got our star board going
14 -- see the first few miles we were pretty slow.

15 MR. JONES: Yeah, go ahead.

16 CAPTAIN LEW: Thank you very much.

17 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: I am just sorry, you know that
18 we couldn't have accomplished more. It was just really, it
19 really bothered me because I can say from the standpoint of
20 the weather wasn't, you know, extremely, you know,
21 overpowered than the bad. It was just right on that ragged
22 edge where the seas are just coming down, you know, 3 or 4
23 feet, winds had come down 10 or 15 knots that would have been
24 within the realm of other boats that (Indiscernible) out
25 there. If anything good comes out of this storm, I might

1 actually get a line cut out of this operation. I have been
2 asking for it you know. Just one of those things, you know.
3 I don't say, I don't know how many times we have done this,
4 nobody says anything and then unfortunately this one turns
5 into a catastrophe and we start paying attention. I mean
6 it's kind of like, how do you think we have looking at? You
7 know, same way all along, it's a terrible situation but
8 that's, I mean, that's the problem with, you know, the fact
9 that we are harbor boat. We can't even pack all of these
10 stuff. That was the only other thing that I just, I really
11 wondered about too as why, you know, the other tugboat in
12 town that had a full crew why they didn't get --

13 CAPTAIN LEW: The Jet Falcon is that you mention?

14 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: Yeah, yeah and just --

15 CAPTAIN LEW: Would you by any chance know the
16 horse power of her?

17 CAPTAIN CAMPBELL: She is about the same, maybe
18 actually a little bit more and she has got caterpillars and
19 we have got EMDs, but you know polar poles -- probably about
20 -- around 4000 horsepower and -

21 CAPTAIN LEW: Okay, thank you.

22 MR. JONES: Thank you.

23

24

25

C E R T I F I C A T E

DEPOSITION SERVICES, INC., hereby certifies that the attached pages represent an accurate transcript of the electronic sound recording of the proceedings of the National Transportation Safety Board Interview regarding the grounding of the Selendang Ayu on December 12, 2004.

INTERVIEW OF CAPTAIN:
ROB CAMPBELL

Susan S.

Transcriber